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The recent book by Martin Staude (2012), Meaning in Communication, Cognition, 
and Reality, which he also defended as a doctoral dissertation in November 2009 at 
the Free University of Berlin,2 proposes a theoretical framework by which meaning-
related phenomena could be described and investigated in psychic and communica-
tive systems. Staude takes an approach to theory-building by which initially the most 
fundamental, abstract and general elements and properties of the theory are chosen 
and discussed. Only after the solid frame is set, are additional layers of complexity 
included by more concrete methodological decisions which remain faithful to the 
foundations. The theory-building is accompanied by a very clear presentation of both 
the contents of the theory thus established and the principles that have guided its 
construction. A substantial portion of the work is dedicated to the development of a 
formal representation that enhances the theory’s transparency even further.
Staude’s ultimate aim for establishing a clear foundation on the most abstract 
level is to create broad connectivity with neighbouring approaches in semiotics, 
philosophy and social sciences. Throughout the work Staude mentions concepts 
in other fields which would allow a good point of contact. In seeking a deliberately 
abstract conceptual basis, Staude starts with the main term ‘meaning’, formulat-
ing a concept that may equally be termed signification, sense, denotation, signified, 
concept, sign, word, code, symbol, description, indication, label, distinction, idea or 
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interpretation (p. 1).3 Thus Staude adopts a stipulative definition (that is, a novel and 
idiosyncratic definition with particular purposes in mind) for the term ‘meaning’ 
that would allow many related processes in psychic and communicative systems to 
be approached in a unified abstract frame.
Staude’s conception of meaning is built around the operation of distinction. 
Namely, Staude argues that in operationalizing a common notion of meaning that is 
based on indication or action, there is a requirement for an operation of distinction 
to be taken into account as a prerequisite for any indication or action to be possible. 
This argument is based on the works of Spencer Brown (1971) and Jokisch’s recon-
struction thereof (1996), and provides the ground for Staude’s conception of mean-
ing as a distinction-based category. A brief definition is given: “A meaning denotes 
‘something particular’, which is marked or indicated, so that it is automatically dis-
tinguished from ‘something different’ or from ‘all the rest’, which remains unmarked 
or ignored” (p. 8). This definition allows some agency for a system or an observer 
who is performing the indications and distinctions; however, centrally for Staude, 
these meanings are also subject to heavy standardization in both cognition and com-
munication and thus an object of investigation is found in intersubjective common-
alities (p. 10). 
Starting from this general definition, Staude places the threshold for the capac-
ity for meanings at a rather rudimentary level – thus describing a very broad vari-
ety of events or actions in the same terms, which to some readers may seem rather 
radical. Staude’s own examples include the salivation of Pavlov’s dog, the discom-
fort felt by a bacterium in a wrong environment, the figure-ground perception of a 
human infant, a common conceptualization of a table, the Western notion of love, 
and an Anglo-American understanding of a legal contract (p. 15). In another step 
of abstraction, Staude also finds all these instances of meaning to be of a linguistic 
kind by designating a language to be “a set of signs or tokens (e.g., words, concepts, 
images, symbols, etc.) and a set of rules for combining these signs or tokens (e.g., 
syntax, syntagmatic conventions, grammar, etc.), which are used in psychic or com-
municative operations” (p. 15). Staude makes these formulations quite explicit and 
openly declares them to be uncommon reconceptualizations at times. The book is 
structured well enough for these instances to be followed and in most cases Staude 
makes his reasoning rather clear. 
The question of the threshold itself could perhaps have been developed further 
as it has been central to many of the endeavours in semiotics and philosophy that 
Staude wants to relate to. For example, he does state that in practical terms among 
human meanings, it provides little information in this context if any category can 
3 Th roughout the review, the page numbers (p. and pp.) refer to the book under review 
(Staude 2012).
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be designated to the sphere of biology or culture (e.g., p. 14); however, the inclusion 
of Pavlov’s dog, for example, does raise suspicions as to whether different types of 
meaning ought eventually to be distinguished or what kind of an observer or system 
is necessary for all of the properties of the meanings that are described to become 
relevant. Staude’s practical examples almost all remain in the sphere of human 
meanings and thus the exact demarcation of these boundaries may not have much of 
an impact on its main object of study, although there is space for additional elabora-
tion. Staude naturally also declares that his framework does not claim to be exhaus-
tive in any way, and many equally interesting objects of study may be found within 
the realm of cognition and communication (p. 3). 
Non-dualist philosophy
A significant portion of the work (pp. 21–84) is dedicated to ontology – that is, the 
question of what exists at all, according to this theory. Staude works on it from two 
angles, giving it a rationalization that ought to be valid from a theory-independent 
view and analysing the particular mechanics and arguments as they pertain directly 
to the theory in question. Staude’s theory of meaning is placed within the frame of 
non-dualism, as it has been formulated by Mitterer (1992; 2001). The main theoreti-
cal position is taken up by arguing against two epistemological positions: realism and 
constructivism. Staude argues that they should both be seen as dualist frameworks 
since both presuppose an underlying reality to which their statements ought to be 
related (with realism maintaining a hopeful stance, and constructivism a sceptical 
one). According to non-dualism, a coherent view instead would presuppose no onto-
logical distinction between the ‘reality’ and statements about it, thus arguing that they 
should be interpreted in the same terms. Thus, instead of the truthfulness or valid-
ity of any claim, the measurements of acceptability should be wholly based on the 
mechanisms of description, such as connectibility and robustness that are described in 
greater length below (p. 75).
Staude supports these claims in dialogues between a dualist and a non-dualist, 
each making a case for their position. This presentation makes Staude’s arguments 
particularly visible, as part of the reasoning requires that the ‘reality that is indepen-
dent of description’ needs to be thought or communicated somehow to make this 
notion in any sense meaningful. However, when any reference is made to an object 
of this type, according to Staude the conversation leads to a logical-vs-performative 
contradiction, that is, the utterance will actually performatively accomplish some-
thing that it simultaneously denies itself doing (i.e. bringing this ‘reality’ into the 
sphere of descriptions) (p. 31). There are a few possible positions which Staude 
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mentions that a dualist could coherently hold to various extents, such as taking 
the attitude of a sceptic about the non-existence of reality, and that of an agnostic 
towards the unknown reality or psycho-communicative silence, each of which has 
some problems that make them less suitable for a research paradigm, although 
Staude does suggest that these could be explored in further studies (pp. 54–57).
Describing the argument from within the theory, it is useful to incorporate the 
novel formalism that was used in the book. This takes as a basic element an onto-
logical marker M for meaning, which can be schematically placed in the sphere of 
meanings as M vs MELSE or M vs MANOTHER representing a distinction between this 
meaning and others. Thus a distinction between reality/world and descriptions/
meanings could be represented as W vs M, which in a non-dualist framework would 
be represented as MW vs MM or M(W VS M). The latter two representations take an onto-
logical W to be nonsensical and make it transparent that the distinction between 
‘real things’ and ‘mere descriptions’ belongs fully to the sphere of meanings. MW and 
MM can thus be taken as types or modes of being within that sphere of meanings that 
describe particular meanings, or as it is difficult to differentiate the modes from the 
elements, it can be said that MW is a meaning that auto-describes itself as a meaning 
and Mw is a meaning that auto-describes itself as pertaining to reality. The formal-
ism has been extended to refer to particular contents by “= │...│”, such as MW = 
│TABLE│ or MW = │BLACK THING│ that are “descriptions M that auto-describe 
them(selves) as objects W but not as descriptions M, because in everyday semantics 
tables and black things are considered to be material, permanent, external, resistant, 
or observable entities, so they are seen to belong to the ontological level of objects W 
but not to the ontological level of descriptions M” (p. 64).
Relations between the meanings
Staude’s basic framework of distinction-based meanings as they appear to a system or 
an observer is extended and made more concrete in various dimensions. In elabora-
tion of the MW vs MM, Staude introduces a temporal distinction to the framework, 
distinguishing between meanings up to now and meanings from now on. Meanings 
up to now refer to the prevailing descriptions that are supposed to be in place at the 
moment of use or utterance, while meanings from now on refer to descriptions that 
work by modifying or adding something to the description as it has been accepted. A 
natural dialogue can be seen as a constant flow between the two types of meanings as 
certain meanings are accepted and other meanings are introduced modifying or elab-
orating them. Thus, for example, the reference from MM to MW can be seen as a mean-
ing from now on referring to a meaning up to now. The temporal characterization 
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is more general than the one relating ‘meanings’ and ‘world’ and is dependent on 
specific circumstances. 
Abstracting even further, Staude introduces the notions of connectivity and 
robustness to characterize the relations that guide the use of meanings. A high mea-
sure of connectivity characterizes the ability of a meaning up to now to generate a 
high number of meanings from now on that semantically refer to or connect to the 
meaning up to now. For example in a conversation this refers to possible continua-
tions to a particular utterance, thus “accepting or rejecting a meaning-description 
corresponds to a high connectivity, whereas ignoring a meaning-description corre-
sponds to a high discontinuity” (p. 74). A high measure of robustness characterizes 
the ability of a meaning up to now to generate a high number of meanings from now 
on that semantically accept or presuppose the meaning up to now, in other words 
allowing it to remain valid, accepted and unchanged. In natural discourse a scale in 
robustness can be seen proceeding from low to high, for example in lies, opinions, 
facts, reality (p. 74).
Refining the distinction between the reality and descriptions, Staude also incor-
porates the semiotic triangle to his framework by introducing a non-dualist ver-
sion of it (adapting particularly the model of Ogden and Richards 1994: 16). In a 
non-dualist semiotic triangle its main elements the signifier, the meaning, and the 
referent are seen as MS, MM, and MR, that is, elements that auto-describe themselves 
as either signifiers, meanings or referents. For example, “the referent is an M that 
auto-describes it(self) as a referent R, i.e., as a concrete and empirical entity, object, 
exemplar, event, behaviour, fact, actor, or phenomenon in the real world. According 
to this auto-description, the referent is material, permanent, external, resistant, con-
straining, observable, difficult to modify or avoid, objective, ontologically distinct 
from meaning and description, non-symbolic and non-referential because it sim-
ply is or happens without referring to something other than itself ” (p. 85). This is 
also naturally accompanied with a relativist position in the reading of signs – that 
is, based on the arguments by Peirce and Chandler (CP 2.308; Chandler 2002: 17), 
a sign is only a sign if it is seen as such, but also anything can be a sign if it is seen 
as such. Thus in an analysis of meaning “a M = │SCALE│ is for one observer sim-
ply the non-symbolic object MR = │SCALE│, whereas for another observer it is the 
symbolic object or signifier MS = │SCALE│ that symbolizes the meaning MM = 
│LAW AND JUSTICE│” (p. 90).
Staude accommodates the non-dualist semiotic triangle to demonstrate vari-
ous formulations of other processes and relations that traditionally belong to the 
research area of semantics (pp. 85–123). Particular representations are created for 
extension and intension, classification, onomasiology and semiology, meaning 
interpretation, and meaning convergence, providing a rather succinct formulation 
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for each of them. Additionally, Staude brings in the notion of prototypicality, argu-
ing that in social and cognitive systems the boundaries between meanings are often 
fuzzy, and also within the auto-descriptions of particular meanings the idea of pro-
totypicality is often included. Thus, for example, an apple is a typical fruit, while an 
olive is a very unusual fruit. It is quite natural to encounter sentences like “Strictly 
speaking, a penguin is a bird” (p. 135) or “Ackees are fruits, but they are not edible” 
(p. 135). Staude considers a variety of models of prototypicality (p. 147) and chooses 
one with a gradient structure of prototypicality with a categorical centre as the most 
suitable one for particular analyses of meaning in analysing social systems as it theo-
retically allows both gradience and discreteness for any particular meaning under 
study (p. 156).
Medium, form, and meaning fields
A central term by which the relations between meanings could be investigated and 
described is in Staude’s framework a meaning field – that is, a cluster of meanings that 
describes a level of organization beyond the atomicity of a single meaning, but at the 
same time allows a certain focus by considering only a part from the universe of all 
meanings (pp. 160–165). Crucially, while meanings in their atomicity and meanings 
as they pertain to the entire sphere of meanings are made of the same stuff, and also 
meanings that are currently indicated or negated are of the same stuff as the ones that 
are not, there is an additional aspect that is needed to describe the use of particular 
meanings in particular circumstances. Staude introduces a distinction between the 
meaning medium and the meaning form that is inspired by Niklas Luhmann’s (1984) 
very similar distinction (p. 72). The two are thus connected via a process of trans-
formation, whereby the latent, inactivated, uncoupled mass of meanings that is the 
medium allows a smaller selection of manifest, activated uncoupled meanings that is 
the form to temporarily emerge (pp. 211–229). This process is termed activation and 
roughly corresponds to “the concrete use, selection, or appearance of meanings or 
meaning fields by a particular actor, system, or discourse” (p. 269).
While in one sense the entire universe of meanings works as a medium for these 
activations, it is possible to find more particular areas that function as medium for 
particular (inter)actions or that fulfil a relatively stronger role in the minds of a par-
ticular actor (p. 213). This is where meaning fields come into play as meaning medi-
ums that bring out certain meaning forms (p. 269). In this sense for example an M = 
│NO-PARKING SIGN│ might activate the meaning field MFLAW within which the 
sign could be connected with particular sanctions such as fines (p. 218). Meaning 
fields are often manipulated via particular meanings; however, Staude emphasizes a 
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dynamic relationship between them as activations and subsequent deactivations of 
particular meanings work to reproduce and rejuvenate particular meanings (p. 212), 
while meaning fields as media also change over time through particular uses (p. 
169). Without activation, a medium may atrophy and lose its connections within the 
general sphere of meanings akin to any processes of habit formation (p. 212).
The concept of a meaning field thus proposes a conceptual paradigm by which 
patterns and organizations in the sphere of meanings may be studied (such as the 
meaning fields of law and power). The empirical procedures involved are inspired 
by Geertz’s (1973) thick description with the aim of addressing a multitude of dif-
ferent first-order perspectives of emic and etic varieties in order to compose a stipu-
lative second-order analysis that conceptualizes the data in terms of meanings and 
meaning fields along with their activation and non-activation (pp. 197–207). This 
allows for observations to be gathered from various extrospective sources and also 
introspection as a variety of emic auto-description that may be eventually combined 
(pp. 207–210). As a combination of different types of data, meaning fields emerge 
as highly condensed and confirmed groupings of meanings, which are situation-
ally independent, highly generalized, and thus easily repeated. At the same time 
their particular manifestations are to be observed as related to particular actors, and 
meaning fields may also relate interindividually to each other in complex patterns, 
such as contradiction, subversion, counter-meaning fields, inclusion, overlap, mar-
ginal vs dominant meaning fields, etc. (p. 170).
Prospects
Staude sets forth a novel framework which gathers much of the intuitions within 
social sciences, philosophy and semiotics to designate an object for research on a 
very abstract level. This provides both a capable toolbox by which practical research 
may be performed, and a vantage point for comparisons between different theoretical 
frameworks to be grounded. The basis is solid and well developed and the book even 
provides rather concrete and practical instructions as to how future research should 
be conducted. The eventual reception of Staude’s framework may, however, depend 
particularly on whether the researchers will find the questions proposed in the book 
interesting enough and a productive angle to investigate from. That is, for example, 
whether questions like “what is the structure of the meaning field of health among the 
New Guinea Mountain People?” (p. 272) and “when is the meaning of unlawfulness 
activated in doctor-patient-interactions?” (p. 272) will be received as interesting prob-
lems for the researchers to pursue. Staude also provides his own assessment that his 
basic framework particularly has room for specification by building stronger claims 
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as to interconnectedness of different observable elements that can be both tested and 
applied in case studies on particular circumstances (p. 270–272).
Among the opportunities for theoretical comparison, there is an aspect that 
seems particularly promising for further evaluations in the eyes of the reviewer. 
Staude claims that constructivism and realism as defined are effectively quasi-
monopolistic in the social sciences, which is why non-dualism is a fresh wind (p. 
26). This could be substantiated further by indicating the exact disciplinary bound-
aries in mind, but as Staude himself indicates, his proposal has numerous predeces-
sors in for example the Linguistic Turn, the Semantic Turn, the Cognitive Turn, the 
Interpretive Turn and others (p. 62). Based on the very clear and abstract theoretical 
foundations given, there is room for more precise formulations of how exactly dual-
isms in various studies emerge and how they impact the research results that they 
are thus able to provide.
Granted, Staude makes a clear case for Luhmann’s systems theory to be dualist 
due to its distinction between societal semantics and social structures despite the 
bidirectional and flexible influence between them, on which the reviewer will also 
have to rely. However as demonstrated with Staude’s own MW vs MM distinction, 
the ontological questions pertain to the outermost frame of any theory, and thus in 
other cases a distinction present in the terminology might not extend to the basic 
ontology. For example, a plausible non-dualist theorist can be found in a predecessor 
of and a strong influence on Luhmann – Vilfredo Pareto. Even though in numerous 
places he implements categories which have a dualist background, he also provides a 
larger frame: for example as in “We must not be misled by the names [objective and 
subjective] we give to the two classes. In reality both are subjective, for all human 
knowledge is subjective” (Pareto 1935: 76). 
It is possible that there is some injustice in Staude’s description of Peirce’s semi-
otic triangle as dualist (p. 83). Granted, he does emphasize the role of practical 
results and behaviour in an assessment of an interpretant; however, Staude him-
self describes Peirce’s pansemiotism as very close to non-dualism (p. 62). There is 
an extra difficulty in that Peirce’s ideas exhibited significant change over time, and 
thus perhaps earlier ideas may not be compatible with later ones. If one views the 
notions of behaviour or event from a pansemiotic angle, one would have to con-
clude that Peirce’s semiotic triangle is non-dualist as well (although very different 
in its make-up). There are indeed numerous approaches that have tried to tackle the 
problem of meaning only deriving from meaning or signs from signs and, with the 
help of Staude’s formal description of the philosophical background (put forward by 
Mitterer), there is now an opportunity to make the basics explicit in a concise man-
ner. Another candidate that may be of particular interest is the model of the semio-
sphere as composed within the Tartu–Moscow School (Lotman 2005). While at one 
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end of investigations there is particularly the non-compatibility and the possibilities 
for dialogue between different semiospheres, also a global semiosphere can be seen 
there that may bear a strong resemblance to Staude’s sphere of meanings. There may 
be quite a few other frameworks and research programmes that start from the same 
foundations without declaring the philosophical background so explicitly as Staude. 
The commonalities and the conceptual differences between such different formula-
tions on possibly very similar foundations may well prove to be a fruitful area for 
theoretical investigation.
Staude proposes an interesting framework that opens up new areas of study 
within the social sciences in a very clear and deliberate manner. The explicitness by 
which the core is built up may indeed be presented as a textbook example for future 
students attempting to tread the path of theory-building. While the particular con-
cepts proposed (such as the meaning field) will have to compete with other theo-
retical proposals for a conceptualization of the domain of meanings (for example, 
the ones based on conflict, dialogue, translation, etc.), the abstract characterization 
provided by the author allows these theoretical points of contrast to be placed on an 
especially clear and lucid background. The author also makes a sufficient case for the 
details that may be a capable contender, among other things providing an immersive 
vocabulary that gives theory-specific interpretations to the common notions that he 
initially presents the theory with (e.g., meaning, semantic, robustness, connectivity, 
etc.). The effort Staude makes is strong, both in the book’s theoretical content as well 
as in establishing accessibility for a potential audience, and deserves a closer look 
from anyone interested in the variety of ways to study processes of meaning, possibly 
to even provide a vantage point from which these dangerous waters could be charted 
in other contexts.
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